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INTRODUCTION
In his later writing, Michel Foucault examines the various and complex ways in which power is exercised in society. Political rationalities, as Foucault explains, are ways of rendering reality knowable for the purpose of governance. Contemporary state governance, he suggests, consists of a triangle of such rationalities; sovereignty, discipline and government, 1 which together he terms 'governmentality'. Early sovereign technologies entailed the use of repressive force by the state, in an effort to establish and maintain effective control over geographical territory, exemplified by the spectacle of the public execution. Of greater interest to Foucault, however, are the complex modern forms of governance, exacted through a combination of disciplinary and governmental technologies, operating not simply repressively but productively, designed to strengthen the state by improving the very soul of the subject. Discipline, on the one hand, entails the production of docile and co-operative individuals (through processes of surveillance, classification and normalization) and populations (through If discipline individualizes and normalizes, and biopower collectivizes and socializes, ethopolitics concerns itself with the self-techniques by which human beings should judge t better than they are. 4 Of particular importance for Rose, as we shall see, is the role of 'community' as both ethopolitical es. various ways in which advanced liberal rule seeks to govern through both agents of crime control and young offenders themselves within the particular (constructed) field of 'anti-social behaviour'. 8 At the heart of government initiatives in this area is the antisocial behaviour order (ASBO); a civil order directed towards the prevention of future anti-social behaviour through the deterrent effect of criminal sanction on breach. 9 Recently, the Government has challenged the right to anonymity of those (predominantly young) people targeted by the ASBO; what I term 'ASBO subjects', by encouraging greater use of publicity by local agencies while simultaneously reducing the legal rights protecting children from publicity under the 1933 Children and Young
Persons Act ('the 1933 Act'). In this paper, I suggest that the rise of the 'naming and shaming' of the ASBO subject can be usefully explained in terms of the complex and contra governance'. 12 Second, a diachronic model of advanced liberal governance highlights dictory governmental mentalities and technologies of the advanced liberal state.
In so doing, I acknowledge from the outset criticisms that the tendency to equate advanced liberal forms of rule with the governmental techniques of neo-liberalism provides only a cursory analysis of contemporary crime control in England and
Wales. 10 I return instead to Foucault's sovereignty-discipline-governmentality triangle, recognising, as Stenson does, the synchronic rather than diachronic interrelationship between these three rationalities. Crime and Disorder Act (CDA) 1998, s. 1. The ASBO has received almost universal criticism from academic commentators. Criticisms focus upon both the legal and criminological implications of the order. Criminological assessments note the high breach rate, bringing many young people prematurely within the criminal justice system, together with the failure to tackle the underlying causes of anti-social behaviour: E. Accordingly, it employs Government policy documents, ministerial statements and formal guidance on the use of publicity to support its claims about the changing central government rationalities underpinning the control of youth crime and their impact upon governance through anonymity. However, recognising that the operation of the right to anonymity is regulated by law as well as politics, the paper also explores the legal infrastructure behind the right to anonymity, and its role in providing 'authorization' 17 for these governmental techniques or, as Tadros puts it, its importance as 'an interface through which governmental decisions can take effect by adjusting the operations and arrangements of the disciplinary mechanisms'. 18 Thus, the paper engages in a genealogy of the right to anonymity, following its inception in the 1933 Act, through legislative reform and judicial precedents on its appropriate implementation, together with the treatment under the Human Rights Act of ASBO publicity released by public authorities. formal intervention by the criminal justice system to control troublesome conduct should be avoided wherever possible. 31 The right to anonymity was a key component of this governmental strategy, designed to shield the subject from the particular stigma of community disapproval which might otherwise reinforce the subject's self-conception as deviant.
Nevertheless, the principle of youth anonymity has been confronted since its inception by competing discourses promoting the value of publicity of legal proceedings. Historically, the predominant challenge has been that posed by classical, rather than advanced liberal, rule and its abstract, constitutional concern with the defence of individual freedom against state tyranny. Importance tends to be placed, There may be grounds for imposing reporting restrictions during application proceedings concerning a juvenile, but in my view the situation changes if an ASBO is made.
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He then proceeded to suggest that there should, in fact, be a presumption in favour of publicity in such circumstances. Subsequently, this position found its way into official policy, in the form of Home Office guidance which now explicitly advocates the identification of the ASBO subject as part of a post-application media strategy. ASBO publicity involving young people, it demands, is to be the norm rather than the exception.
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What began as a political problematization, however, developed quickly into a legal one, with criticism levelled eventually at the anonymity rights granted by the 1933
Act. It soon became clear to the Government that the structure of the legislation hindered the pursuit of greater publicity of the ASBO subject. Application for an original, or 'stand alone' ASBO is sought before the magistrates' court, and as such section 39 applies to these proceedings, creating a presumption in favour of publicity. In 
39
In each case, welfarist discourses (notably, tending to take the form of altruistic rather than governmental arguments) continue to pose a political challenge to the dismantling of the principle of youth anonymity.
Importantly, criticism has refocused, particularly, upon the impact of labelling.
Elizabeth Burney, for instance, has warned that
[t]he practical arguments in favour of publicising ASBOs notwithstanding, the practice is likely to be particularly harmful where young people are involved, as well as unwise.
She continues 'shame by itself, without any reintegrating process is likely to be counter- the analysis set out above, interestingly Burney's challenge operates at both an altruistic and governmental level. She raises an altruistic concern, on the one hand, that publicity may harm the ASBO subject by encouraging his or her social exclusion. On the other, however, she warns that publicity will prove not only harmful but 'unwise', implying a governmental concern that labelling, exacerbated by publicity, impacts negatively upon efforts to either safeguard the subject's natural capacity for ethical self-governance, or else undermines his or her effective reconstruction through social work.
This article explores the rationale behind the Government's desire for greater publicity of the ASBO subject. In doing so, it explains its problematization of youth anonymity in terms of the often complex and contradictory rationalities and 
NEO-CONSERVATISM AND THE FALL OF YOUTH ANONYMITY
Ultimately, the fall of anonymity of the ASBO subject is best explained as a corollary to contemporary challenges to the expertise and practices of welfarism under advanced liberal rule. 41 Members of the governmentality school tend to argue that the rationalities Neo-conservatism challenges the knowledge claims of both welfarist criminologies of everyday life and the other. Notwithstanding the former's construction of the 'anti-social' youth progressing inevitably towards responsible freedom, his neoconservative counterpart is treated in no uncertain terms as other. As Squires explains, New Labour clearly views anti-social behaviour not as normal adolescent conduct but 'the seedbed of delinquency, the beginning of a persistent offending career'. 44 However, this criminology of the other is unlike its welfarist predecessor. In line with other aspects of contemporary social policy, governance of youth anti-social behaviour is increasingly (but not wholly) organised around neo-conservatism's moralistic aetiology of criminal conduct. 45 Rose notes that under advanced liberal forms of rule:
The pervasive image of the perpetrator of crime is not one of the juridical subject of the rule of law, nor that of the social and psychological subject of criminology, but of the individual who has failed to accept his or her responsibilities as a subject of moral community. The 'anti-social' youth subject is assumed to be quite capable of responsible freedom, but has selfishly refused to exercise it. The neo-conservative criminology of the other frames anti-social behaviour in terms of disrespect and irresponsibility, rather than a natural part of growing up, or a symptom of blameless pathology.
Neo-conservative reconstruction of the 'anti-social' youth has had important consequences for the rationalities and technologies deployed in their governance. As we have seen, the welfarist criminology of the other places a considerable degree of faith in the ability of social work to normalize anti-social youth. Conversely, the move from an explanation of the causes of anti-social behaviour focused in part upon pathology to one defined in terms of an outright refusal to exercise responsible freedom leads inevitably to the conclusion that the disciplinary role of social work is governmentally irrelevant.
The source of appropriate governance of anti-social behaviour rests not with professional intervention but, instead, with the 'anti-social' youth him or herself.
Moreover, the most appropriate way in which to govern the subject is assumed to be the residual technologies of what Mitchell Dean terms 'authoritarian governmentality'.
Dean recognises that, while the advanced liberal state has increasingly sought to govern through subtle forms of disciplinary and ethopolitical technique, direct sovereign rule continues for 'certain populations held to be without the attributes of responsible freedom.' 47 He explores the ways in which crime control continues to rely upon 'despotic' forms of government where the subject has failed to engage in effective processes of ethical self-governance. He describes this as 'authoritarian governmentality, [or] … non-liberal and explicitly authoritarian types of rule that seek to operate through obedient rather than free subjects, or, at a minimum, endeavour to neutralize opposition to authority.' 48 Neo-conservative discourse presumes that, rather than independently exercising appropriate self-governance, or requiring the disciplinary intervention of social work, the ASBO subject has actively rejected the demand to exercise his inherent capacity for responsible freedom. Given this combination of capacity, and unwillingness, to respond to ethopolitical exhortation, governance must be instilled instead through the direct sovereign prohibition of the order's criminal sanction.
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The neo-conservative rejection of the rationalities of welfarist criminologies of everyday life and the other is reinforced further by concomitant challenges to the 47 M. Dean, op. cit. n. 14, p. 131. 48 Id. traditional altruistic justifications for welfarism. Neo-conservatism encourages an exclusionary rather than inclusionary approach towards the 'anti-social' youth subject.
Because anti-social behaviour by young people is treated as evidence of a rejection of the moral norms of society, rather than part of growing up or pathology, society is absolved of its welfarist moral obligations towards those individuals. As Rose writes, within neo-conservative discourse,
[t]hose who refuse to become responsible, to govern themselves ethically, have also refused the offer to become members of our moral community. Hence, for them, harsh measures are entirely appropriate. Three strikes and you are out:
citizenship becomes conditional upon conduct. 50 Thus, the successful contemporary reconstruction of the ASBO subject as a symbol of a depraved and dangerous youth underclass 51 provides moral justification for the punitive and exclusionary potential of the order.
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Similarly, neo-conservatism has had a fundamental impact upon the right to anonymity for the ASBO subject. Once again, the construction of the ASBO subject as a morally degenerate other deals a blow to altruistic arguments for their protection from the stigma associated with publicity by fostering a sense of justified indignation at their apparent irresponsibility and disrespect. The shame that might ensue from publicity of anti-social behaviour is treated increasingly as a legitimate penalty for the ASBO subject, in much the same way as an adult offender. Indeed, the right of the ASBO subject to anonymity is viewed as a startling illustration of the degree to which the welfarist state had become 'soft' on youth crime. Moreover, neo-conservatism poses an apparently coherent challenge to the governmental objectives behind the right to anonymity. The Government's disconcerting silence on the issue of labelling should be treated as an implicit neo-conservative rejection of this welfarist ethopolitical strategy.
It is, of course, fairly unsurprising that New Labour would be reluctant to entertain an ethopolitics of labelling. As we have seen, the theory advocates that formal criminal justice measures should be avoided whenever possible in the governance of 'anti-social' youth. Conversely, neo-conservatism dictates that it is not the intervention of the criminal justice system into the lives of 'anti-social' youth, but its historic failure to intervene, that has led to an apparently pervasive youth culture of disrespect and irresponsibility. Consequently, the Respect agenda has brought low level disorder by young people within the net of the criminal justice system, responding to it instead through the authoritarian governmentality of formal, sovereign processes of enforcement such as the ASBO.
More importantly, neo-conservatism also challenges the knowledge claims of labelling theory. I have argued that the ethopolitics of labelling depends for its power as a rationality upon a particular, welfarist construction of 'anti-social' youth. It assumes that the youth ASBO subject is both capable of and willing to exercise responsible freedom, achievable either independently or, where the conduct is deemed pathological, with the support of the disciplinary processes of social work. The ultimate concern of an ethopolitics of labelling is that a young person's inevitable progress to responsible freedom will be undermined by the countervailing processes of community stigma arising from publicity, encouraging the 'anti-social' subject to actively reject those moral norms. Yet labelling theory fails under a neo-conservative reconstruction of the ASBO subject. Rather than progressing steadily towards appropriate ethical selfgovernance, the neo-conservative youth subject is assumed to have already rejected outright society's moral demands. Thus, he is positioned, not as a subject at risk of descent from circuits of inclusion to circuits of exclusion, 53 but one operating firmly within those latter circuits from the outset. Accordingly, stripped of its original preventative welfarist rationale, the governmental possibilities of anonymity can be increasingly ignored.
THE RISE OF YOUTH PUBLICITY AS AN ETHOPOLITICAL TECHNOLOGY
Thus far, I have argued that the perceived value of anonymity, as an ancillary mechanism designed to protect young offenders from the impact of community stigma for both altruistic and governmental reasons, has been undermined by neo-conservative representations of the ASBO subject. It is the further contention of this section that the (at least partial) movement from welfarism to advanced liberal forms of rule within youth justice policy has ensured not only the fall of anonymity, but the simultaneous rise of publicity in the governance of the ASBO subject. In 2006, the Home Office released guidance to practitioners on ASBO publicity, setting out a number of justifications for its use: enforcement of the order; public reassurance about safety;
53 Rose, op. cit., n. 6. public confidence in local services; deterrence to perpetrators and deterrence to others. On one analysis, then, the extension of responsibility for surveillance of the ASBO to communities is a straightforward example of neo-liberal responsibilization, with 'members of the public being constituted as competent and skilled agents' of crime control. 66 It appears, however, that the governmental mentalities behind this particular process of responsibilization are broader than this. As Flint notes, community is viewed simultaneously as both a ready source of governmental power and a target for ethopolitical strategies. Indeed, behind the responsibilization strategy once can identify a desire not only to better govern the ASBO subject, but additionally to better govern the community itself. The Home Office guidance states that ASBOs are community-based orders that involve local people not only in the collection of evidence but also in helping to enforce breaches. By their nature they encourage local communities to become actively involved in reporting crime and disorder and contributing actively to building and protecting the community. 67 Here, the Government confirms explicitly that the surveillance role of the community is part of a more general ethopolitical strategy to create an 'active citizenry' willing and capable of civic engagement; part of its commitment to what it terms civil renewal. Arguably, the Government's ethopolitics of surveillance, encouraged by publicity of the ASBO subject, pits the community against the ASBO subject in a relationship of mutual suspicion. As such, it has the potential to promote an active citizenry of a firmly neoconservative, exclusionary bent.
(b) Governing through community: the ethopolitics of shame
Rose describes ethopolitical strategies as operating 'through the self-steering forces of honour and shame, or propriety, obligation, trust, fidelity, and commitment to others'.
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Harnessing these internal processes is central to advanced liberal efforts to govern, from a distance, by encouraging a subject's own powers of ethical self-improvement. The governmental efficacy of shame, like each of these ethopolitical processes, requires subjects to be bound by what Vaughan terms an 'emotional attachment' to 'appropriate "webs of belonging'''. 72 Increasingly, it is one's community that has been identified as the territory within which those webs can be found, and, accordingly, where an ethopolitics of shame must necessarily take place. Indeed, in line with these developments, the following section explores how the granting of an ASBO is expected to encourage the ASBO subject, through shame, to work on themselves and align themselves again with the norms of the community. Publicity, in this context, is intended to intensify the ethopolitical power of shame through the widest possible transmission of the ASBO subject's details and offending conduct. The Government's recalcitrance in advocating an ethopolitics of shame appears strange,
given its own neo-conservative construction of the ASBO subject as other, and the concomitant punitive discourses that underpin other aspects of its anti-social behaviour policies. Indeed, I believe that in reality the valorisation of shame fits the Government's own communitarian sensibilities. However, I would suggest that its apparent rejection of this governmental technique could simply reflect a pragmatic concern that explicit advocacy of the shaming of the ASBO subject would simply be too Draconian for many members of the electorate to accept, persuading it to emphasise the more rational objective of effective public surveillance of the order instead. If so, the decision illustrates the continued possibility of a role for welfarist resistance in policy formation;
an issue returned to in the final part of this paper. It also highlights the limits of the predominantly textual approach of this paper, perhaps leaving hidden much of the true nature of the rationalities and technologies operating around the ASBO subject. Before proceeding, I want to note finally an interesting implication of the move towards community-based governance of the ASBO subject for our genealogy of youth anonymity. As contended from the outset, the rise of anonymity as a governmental technology was, in part, an attempt by the welfare liberal state to restrict the operation of community-based processes as they relate to the young offender, as it was perceived that these processes, in the form of community stigma, would undermine their progress to responsible freedom, by classifying them as deviant. Yet now, as a consequence of the neo-liberal rationalities underpinning advanced liberalism, community (rather than the state) has been elevated to a prominent role in the governance of the ASBO subject.
Rather than attempting to remove the ASBO subject from the disciplinary circuits of communities, the latter has become now an integral component of his or her control.
The welfarist ethopolitics of labelling, fearful of the governmental processes of community, have been superseded by the advanced liberal ethopolitics of shame, with those processes at its core.
Yet once again, notwithstanding the growing acceptance of an ethopolitics of shame, its value as a technique for the governance of the ASBO subject is contentious.
One concern is that communities may well not be able to impose the necessary 'webs of belonging' within which the behaviour of the ASBO subject can be contained. There is a tendency under neo-liberalism to construct communities idealistically as inherently capable of effective self-regulation, if only they were allowed do to so by an overbearing state. John Flint, however, argues convincingly that all too often the necessary social capital required to do so is unavailable in the deprived communities most in need of the power of governance over its members. 80 Either the required social cohesion no longer exists within a community, or it exists but an absence of collective efficacy prevents it from being deployed. Indeed, Flint contends that it was the fact that the appeal to responsibilized communities proved so unsuccessful in the areas suffering from the most debilitating forms of anti-social behaviour that forced the Government to resort to direct intervention through, inter alia, the ASBO.
The ethopolitics of shame may also prove ineffectual because many ASBO knowledge and expertise deployed to govern and maintain solidarity in and over their own territories and populations. 81 Accordingly, sovereign forms of governance are often employed to reinstate control over particular political and geographical spaces. 82 Returning to the specific ethopolitics of shame, it might be argued that in certain circumstances the ASBO subject will be governed more successfully by the competing forces of what Stenson refers to as 'youth self-organization', 83 or governance by his or her peer group.
Indeed, evidence suggests that the ASBO subject could in fact be tied into the competing web of his or her peer group much more firmly than that of the disapproving community. Resistance to the ethopolitics of shame as a consequence of the ASBO subject's position within processes of youth self-organization may help to explain the conclusion of recent research into attitudes towards ASBOs among young people carried out by NACRO and the Policy Research Bureau that both the imposition and publicising of an ASBO acts as a badge of honour, rather than shame, for certain individuals. 84 That is not to say that shame is an inherently ineffective governmental technique.
John Braithwaite, in his seminal research on governance through shame, argued convincingly that shame can have positive consequences for social control. 85 However, at the heart of Braithwaite's thesis was, of course, the fundamental distinction drawn between disintegrative and reintegrative forms of shaming. Only the latter approach, in which concerted efforts are made to integrate the subject back within appropriate 'webs of belonging', will succeed in harnessing the ethopolitical value of this powerful emotion. In the absence of reintegrative modes of shaming, as Schur once pointed out, the exclusionary impact of labelling through publicity may simply reinforce the ASBO subject's sense of association with other anti-social youth and consequently exacerbate that conduct. 86 Indeed, given the demonisation evident in increasingly sensationalist reporting of the ASBO subject, discussed below, the neo-conservative faith in publicity as a way to promote an ethopolitics of shame may, on a welfarist analysis, prove dangerously counter-productive.
THE RISE OF YOUTH PUBLICITY AS A SOVEREIGN TECHNOLOGY
Stenson's reconsideration of sovereign rule reveals how governance is directed not only towards the effective management of individuals and populations, but the control of territory itself. 87 The state has grown increasingly worried about its own governmental limitations, particularly in the face of the pressures of globalisation, transfer of powers to supernational organisations such as the EU and competing claims by communal groups seeking to govern certain populations from below, such as the forces of 'youth self-organization' discussed above. As David Garland recognises, one important way in which the state has sought to regain sovereign control over its political and geographical territory (in terms of electoral success) has been the use of authoritarian crime control to confirm its own authority; flexing its muscles to 'give the impression that something is being done -here now, swiftly and decisively'. 88 Thus, under advanced liberal rule, the sovereign governance of crime is both instrumental and expressive.
Expressive forms of sovereign rule are clearly evident behind the politics of antisocial behaviour. 89 As Squires notes, 'the Law and Order issue', of which the Respect agenda is central, has 'undoubtedly been the making of New Labour'. 90 Crawford adds that,
[t]he current governmental preoccupation with petty crime, disorder and ASB reflects a sense of 'anxiety' about which something can be done in an otherwise uncertain world. 91 Importantly, because the concept of anti-social behaviour is politically constructed, it provides the Government with an opportunity to take control of the issue and define both the problem and its solution, with the Respect agenda, in part at least, an attempt by government to engage directly in a politics of representation about law, order and public safety, an attempt to influence public perceptions directly. 92 The representation that the Government has sought to put forward is an image of a strong state apparatus, capable of effectively tackling the problem of anti-social behaviour, in order to reduce the fear of crime and, accordingly, reinforce its sovereign state by securing the political faith of the electorate.
Hughes and Follett argue that the ASBO is itself an illustration of expressive, as well as instrumental, sovereign rule. 93 The mechanism has proved highly mediagenic, representing to the public the toughness of the Respect agenda, and indeed is viewed by the Government as integral to its electoral success. 94 Moreover, representations of the ASBO are not simply valuable to national government. Local agencies too are able to secure their own positions through displays of sovereign strength. The empirical work of Thomas et al supports this conclusion, suggesting that local agencies are often more interested in using ASBOs to provide reassurance to the community, rather than believing that the order can really change behaviour. 95 In many cases the external, expressive objective of the order takes precedence then over its internal, ethopolitical value. Clearly, for the Government, publicity is vital to the successful deployment of the ASBO as an expressive act of state sovereignty. As its guidance makes clear, publicity is further justified 'as a way to restore public confidence in local services'. 96 Publicity of the ASBO subject is viewed as a symbol of the power of local agencies to tackle not only anti-social behaviour, but also their competence in all forms of public provision.
However, the pursuit of expressive forms of sovereignty poses inevitable governmental dangers. In its effort to shore up faith in national and local government through publicity, Labour has manipulated the fear and insecurity of the public. Yet, ultimately it may find itself unable to meet the expectations it has created. Tonry contends that by making anti-social behaviour into a major social policy problem, and giving it sustained high visibility attention, Labour has made a small problem larger, thereby making people more aware of it and less satisfied with their lives and their government. 97 Indeed, one might note the internal contradictions in the Government's own justifications for publicity of the ASBO subject. One of the additional objectives of Jamieson points out, media attention to the issue may well lead to the 'paradoxical outcome' that the public's fear of crime actually increases. 99 The problem, of course, is that the construction of the debate, at the level of explicit central government discourse at least, is one skewed in favour of punitive responses to anti-social behaviour such as the ASBO. Notwithstanding the continued evidence of welfarist discourses operating around the ASBO subject in practice, the Government is only tentatively willing 'to associate [itself] publicly with, and to promote, responses to offending that are not exclusively punitive'. 100 New Labour's war against anti-social behaviour has actually increased the public's fear of crime, while in reality crime rates continue to fall, threatening to create a 'punishment deficit' between supply and demand of punishment at both national and local level. 101 Moreover, publicity of the ASBO subject could encourage both local and national governments to 
MOVING TOWARDS SENSATIONALISM?
This paper has contended that the deployment of publicity of the ASBO subject reflects the simultaneous deployment of three components of advanced liberal rule. First, publicity seeks to responsibilize communities as agents of crime control, and to promote an ethopolitics of active citizenship, by encouraging surveillance of the ASBO. Second, and controversially, the courts have authorized publicity of the ASBO subject as part of an ethopolitics of shame. Third, and finally, publicity is viewed by national and local government as a way to augment sovereign governance of the electorate, by reducing their fear of crime and consequently increasing faith in the state. In this final section I want to draw together these components of publicity as governmental technologysurveillance, sovereignty and shame -and conclude about their implications for the ASBO subject. My first point, very simply, is that anonymity will be increasingly waived in ASBO proceedings under section 39. Neo-conservative constructions of the ASBO subject undermining the altruistic and governmental role of anonymity, together with the new justifications for publicity of the order, will inevitably impact upon judicial decision-making; an issue explored further in the following section.
Additionally, however, it is likely that publicity will contain increasingly 'sensationalist' representations of the ASBO subject. By sensationalism, I refer to publicity that reinforces the image of the ASBO subject as other through lurid reportage. Exploring this concept further, it is first necessary to identify two sources of ASBO publicity. The first source is, of course, the private media, arising from its traditional role in the reporting of legal proceedings. Harnessing the private media is particularly important for local agencies, according to the Home Office guidance, because their wider distribution allows publicity to reach a large number of individuals within a community affected by anti-social behaviour. Interestingly, from a governmental perspective, the guidance adds that local agencies that impose ASBOs should ensure that they actively engage in the governance of ASBO reportage by the private media. It points to the need to establish 'working relationships' with local media outlets, while emphasising the importance of close control of the material to ensure that the well-being of witnesses and vulnerable defendants are not jeopardised by unsanctioned disclosures. 103 However, it is important to recognise, secondly, that ASBO publicity is carried out not only by the private media but 'in-house' by the public (or quasi-public) agencies who actually impose the orders, in the form of leaflets and website information distributed to local residents.
I would argue that both these sources of publicity, private and public, are susceptible to sensationalism, but for markedly different reasons. With respect to the private press, sensationalism is of course an inevitable consequence of the commercial pressure to pursue newsworthy content that will attract readership and ensure maximum sales. 104 Tabloid newspapers, in particular, tend to secure the attention of a prurient readership by constructing the ASBO subject as a depraved and dangerous other.
Indeed, Thomas et Borough Council to members of the community containing details of a number of children subject to ASBOs. The document itself was clearly sensationalist, describing the individuals at one point as 'animalistic … thugs and bully boys'. 108 The defence argued that the use of such words breached Article 8 of the European Convention.
Kennedy LJ, however, was ultimately happy to allow for this incursion into sensationalism, judging the content of the leaflet entirely proportionate to the legitimate aim of the prevention of crime and disorder. He drew attention to the importance of sensationalism in order to ensure the governmental objective of the responsibilization of communities as agents of surveillance, describing the language as 'colourful, but … needed in order to attract the attention of the readership'. 109 Thus, sensationalism has been authorized by law, through the Stanley judgment, as necessary to foster further an ethopolitics of surveillance.
However, notwithstanding the law's focus upon surveillance, it is contended that the legal authorization of sensationalism will also encourage public agencies to employ sensationalist reportage in pursuit of the other governmental objectives highlighted in this paper. First, sensationalism may be used to reinforce the deviancy of the ASBO subject as other, in order to shore up the community's fear of anti-social behaviour and, as such, their faith in, and dependency upon, these agencies. Second, it could be perceived as a way to increase the efficacy of an ethopolitics of shame. The more demonising ASBO publicity, it might be argued, the more the subject, and others contemplating engaging in anti-social behaviour, will be deterred by the impact upon their reputations. Of course, on the other hand, proponents of welfarism will continue to focus upon the negative impact such sensationalist reportage will have upon the ASBO subject and his or her governance. Sensationalism, they will argue, further reinforces the deviancy of targeted young people, exacerbating the harm caused by stigmatisation and labelling, while the reinforcement of the criminology of the other exacerbates spiralling public fear of 'anti-social' youth and encourages authoritarian responses by the state to further its own sovereignty.
POSSIBILITIES OF WELFARIST RESISTANCE
Notwithstanding these conclusions, it is important to recognise that neo-conservative constructions of the ASBO subject are inevitably not absolute. As the governmentality school makes clear, rationalities and technologies do not follow a clear developmental chronology, and as such are never perfectly implemented in practice. As with general crime control, this is certainly the case with youth justice policy. Muncie warns that any assessment of the youth justice system must avoid constructing its development as a linear progression of rationalities:
The 'new' never replaces the old. In the twenty-first century discourses of protection, restoration, punishment, responsibility, rehabilitation, welfare, retribution, diversion, human rights and so on exist alongside each other in some perpetually uneasy and contradictory manner. 110 It is particularly important to avoid overstating the apparent punitive turn in crime control policies. 111 Newburn notes that, in reality, New Labour's stance on youth justice 'is somewhat tricky to characterize, for … one key element of the Government's style was to "talk tough" while behind the scenes enabling sometimes more enlightened practices to be developed and promulgated'. 112 Not only do many central government initiatives continue to reflect welfarist rationales, but the implementation of authoritarian measures is often resisted at the local level. 113 Thus, the focus of discursive analysis upon the texts of central government can be criticised for failing to capture the empirical realities of the governance of young people resulting particularly from resistance to, and reconstruction of, rationalities and technologies by those who implement them and those upon whom they are implemented.
Hughes and Follett suggest that such contradictory responses are particularly evident in state governance of anti-social behaviour. 114 Indeed, on closer examination the implementation of the ASBO provides support for Pavlich's argument that advanced liberalism does not mark the death of the social, but merely the growth of 'co-social' forms of governance. 115 Burney contends, for instance, that the early failure of local agencies to take up the ASBO was, in part at least, a continued preference for welfarist forms of intervention. 116 Such evidence that exists suggests the ASBO subject remains a target of the disciplinary techniques of social work as a result of the continued welfarist approach to governance of many local agencies, particularly Youth Offending Teams (although recent research has concluded that the balance is still very much in favour of neo-conservative enforcement objectives). 117 Second, welfarist discourses also continue to operate at the level of central government. In particular, Individual Support Orders Thus, within the governable space of the court room, opportunities still exist to reconstruct the ASBO subject in law through, for instance, the discourses of expert evidence or the competing power of international legal standards, both of which continue to promote an ethopolitics of labelling. Yet, while perhaps unduly pessimistic, I would contend finally that successful resistance at the level of the local is, in fact, unlikely. Without a fundamental change to the knowledge-power surrounding the ASBO subject, the rise of publicity as a governmental technique, particularly as part of an ethopolitics of surveillance and shame, will continue to place overbearing pressure upon courts to refuse to grant a section 39 anonymity order to an ASBO subject.
Evidence suggests as much. According to the empirical research of Thomas et al, the It is a characteristic of Foucault's work that he avoids drawing normative conclusions about the value of particular forms of power, 'concentrating, instead, upon 121 Thomas et al, op. cit. n. 84.
the actual way in which power operates'. 122 It is an approach often criticised for precluding effective critique of advanced liberal forms of rule. 123 Throughout this paper, conversely, I have highlighted a number of possible welfarist concerns with the growth in the publicity of the ASBO subject.
Inevitably, governance through the publicity of ASBOs will further increase the stigmatisation of young people that the right to anonymity sought to avoid. The claim under neo-conservative reconstructions of the ASBO subject is that he or she is susceptible to the positive ethopolitics of shame, rather than the negative ethopolitics of labelling. As I have shown, however, the claimed potency of shame as a governmental technique does not seem to be borne out by the available empirical evidence, which suggests conversely that the ASBO subject are often not tied within the necessary webs of belonging to the disapproving elements of the community, but instead may be subject to the more powerful control of competing knowledge, in the form of youth selforganization, that promotes the ASBO as a badge of honour. One must also consider the possibility that labelling could ultimately undermine the effective governance of ASBO subjects. Indeed, deploying Braithwaite's empirical work in this area, disregarded by the common sense of neo-conservatism, disintegrative shaming of this kind has dangerous implications for social exclusion.
The ethopolitics of surveillance poses further problems. For instance, it has not been shown that policing is aided by the publicity of the ASBO subject; it is unclear how much, and how well, the community actually engages in effective surveillance of the order. It seems a little premature, then, for the Government to assume the need for publicity, at the expense of long-standing protections of anonymity, without question. I
am also concerned that the use of surveillance as a form of ethopolitics may lead to the encouragement of a distorted form of active citizenry that reinforces the contemporary neo-conservative, exclusionary, conception of 'anti-social' youth. Furthermore, the pursuit of expressive forms of sovereign rule, in an effort to exert control over political territory, may ultimately cause both central and local government to lose control over the 'anti-social behaviour' problem. Indeed, with sensationalism reinforcing the demonisation of young people, both individually and collectively, as other, inclusionary technologies may prove increasingly unpalatable to a public reliant upon media representations of anti-social behaviour. Finally, I have explored the particular part played by law and legal systems in 'authorising' governance through publicity. As I have contended, the structure of section 39 provides an important opportunity for law's fielding of the various alternative discourses -classical, welfarist and advanced liberal -that currently operate around the right to anonymity of the ASBO subject. In particular, it is the structure of this section that provides an opportunity for particular welfarist discourses (of the expert evidence of social workers and the standards of international law) to reinvigorate both altruistic and governmental discourses that favour anonymity where they are deemed appropriate. My concern, however, is that pervasive neo-conservative constructions of the ASBO subject as other, together with the importance placed by the judiciary upon the value of the ethopolitics of surveillance and shame, will nevertheless lead to a drastic decrease in the granting of section 39 orders. Governance through anonymity looks likely to prove a further welfarist casualty of advanced liberal rule.
***
